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Chad D. McEvoy
Illinois State University
A fundamental belief in professional sport leagues is that competitive balance is needed to maximize demand
and revenues; therefore, leagues have created policies attempting to attain proper competitive balance. Further,
research posits that objectives of professional sport teams’ owners include some combination of winning and
profit maximization. Although the pursuit of wins is a zero sum game, revenue generation and potential profit
making is not. This article focuses upon the National Football League’s potential unintended consequences
of creating the incentive for some teams to free ride on the rest of the league’s talent and brand. It examines
whether an owner’s objectives to generate increased revenues and profits are potentially enhanced by operating
as a continual low-cost provider while making money from the shared revenues and brand value of the league.
The present evidence indicates that, overall, being a low-cost provider is more profitable than increasing player
salaries in an attempt to win additional games.
The ownership of the Cincinnati Bengals has broken
the unwritten contract between a team and its fans.
The ownership of this organization has actively pursued a course of action which has materially indebted
itself to the people of Cincinnati yet has failed to
deliver a competitive product. . . The ownership of
this organization is causing a lack of balance in the
AFC Central and the NFL as a whole. (Mission Statement of MikeBrownSucks.com [Cat, n.d., para.1]).
During the 1990s, the Cincinnati Bengals of the
National Football League (NFL) were the worst team in
the league, averaging just five wins per season (“Standings,” 2008). Mike Brown, owner of the Bengals, is
notorious for his unwillingness to spend money to provide
fans with a decent on-field product (Daugherty, 2008).
However, despite their poor on-field record, the Bengals
were the league’s fifth most profitable team. Further,
additional teams consistently performing poorly on the
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field in this timeframe, such as the Tampa Bay Buccaneers
and the Chicago Bears, were also among the NFL’s most
profitable teams (“NFL team valuations,” 2005). Dallas
Cowboys owner Jerry Jones noted his displeasure with
teams who may be underperforming on the field, while
overachieving (compared with league averages) financially due to revenue sharing (Helyar, 2006). Achieving
the “optimal” level of revenue sharing has been a discussion in owners’ meetings as well as in collective bargaining negotiations with the players (Weisman, 2006).
Similar concerns and anecdotal evidence of greater
profits from inferior team performance exists in other
major North American sport leagues. Under Donald
Sterling’s ownership, the Los Angeles Clippers of the
National Basketball Association (NBA) has consistently
been one of the worst on-the-court teams in the league,
yet is reportedly one of the most profitable (Rovell, 2003).
Before resigning Elton Brand in 2003, the Clippers had
usually either traded or allowed their best players to
leave via free agency instead of paying huge salaries to
retain their services (O’Sullivan, 2002; Rovell). Despite
more than half of the NBA teams making the playoffs
each year, the Clippers has only had four playoff appearances since Donald Sterling bought the team in 1981.
In 2004, Major League Baseball’s (MLB) Tampa Bay
Rays, though ranking near the bottom of the league
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in payroll, home attendance, and winning percentage,
were the second most profitable team behind the Baltimore Orioles, generating $27.2 million in operating
income (Snel, 2005). The Rays’ 2004 profitability was
largely due to a $20 million subsidy provided by MLB’s
revenue-sharing program. Further, revenue sharing may
actually discourage on-field success and hamper profitability. In 2001, 13 of 16 MLB clubs that were required
to contribute to the revenue-sharing pool lost money at
the end of the season. The St. Louis Cardinals finished
tied for first place in the National League Central division
and had income from baseball operations of $1.9 million.
Under MLB’s revenue-sharing model, the Cardinals were
required to pay $8.2 million into the revenue-sharing
pool. This resulted in a $6.4 million loss after revenue
sharing (Pappas, 2002).
Articles in the popular press and trade publications have specifically discussed the recent profitability
“problems” in professional sports and their possible link
to league revenue-sharing models (Bloom, 2006; Dosh,
2007). In MLB, critics have noted that even though revenue-sharing dollars are designed to improve team performance, smaller revenue producing franchises have spent
the money on any set of expenses or even pocketed it as
profit rather than improved their on-field performance
(Bloom; Kovacevic, 2005; Snel, 2005; Weir, 2002). For
some teams, such as the Pittsburgh Pirates or Milwaukee Brewers, it appears that revenue sharing is creating
a disincentive to compete for top players. Those teams
have received considerable criticism for continuing to
decrease their player payroll despite receiving increased
revenue-sharing payments under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and generating higher unshared
revenues from new facilities (Dosh, 2007).
These anecdotal examples suggest that, in North
American sport leagues, it might be possible to increase
overall net income by fielding a less expensive, and often
less talented, team. When one franchise in a chain of
restaurants, for instance, can maintain or even enhance
profitability by consistently offering subpar service
because the other members of the chain support marketing activities that enhance the brand value, free riding
has occurred (Lopatka & Herndon, 1997). In sport, if a
free-rider could reap larger profits than other teams in
its league through the decision to decrease operational
expenses, the overall brand value of the league could
eventually decrease.
The purpose of this study was to empirically test
whether free riding exists in the NFL. The NFL was
chosen for analysis because it shared approximately 70%
of its overall revenues among its franchises, a greater
percentage than any other major North American professional league (Alesia, 2002; Bell, 2004). Just as important
is the availability of sufficient NFL data, compared with
other leagues, to test these ideas. Lopatka and Herndon
(1997) specifically noted the NFL’s revenue-sharing
model’s potential to encourage minimal owner investments in player payroll; “indeed, NFL owners have a
greater interest in preventing free riding than do owners

of teams in other leagues because of the NFL’s unusually high level of revenue sharing” (p. 760). There is
certainly the possibility that other leagues have free-riding
franchises that lower player quality while generating
greater profits, but the NFL’s revenue-sharing model and
sources of shared revenue (primarily its national television contracts) spurred this investigation. Contrary to
previous literature, this article directly tests the impact
of free riding on team profits and the resulting incentives
involved. While revenue sharing is not necessary to cause
free riding, it can serve to enhance the incentives for
owners to free ride. This article shows that free riding
does exist in the NFL (utilizing 10 years’ worth of team
level data), and specifically demonstrates which teams
are free riding.
Specifically, the article is organized in the following
sections. First, the literature review examines professional sports’ league structures as well as the specific
financial information pertinent to an investigation of the
NFL. Next, the article presents the scholarly literature
pertaining to free riding in professional sports, followed
by a section that develops a theory investigating why free
riding results from incentives created by the NFL. The
article then presents and discusses data used to examine
the theory. Finally, the article provides data analysis, and
presents conclusions and a discussion of implications
for the NFL as well as other professional sport leagues.

Review of Literature
Franchises within professional sport leagues operate
not as independent organizations desiring to completely
eliminate their fellow competitors, but as a quasi-socialist
franchisee-franchisor cartel (Scully, 1995). While teams
compete on the field, they collaborate in other business
activities to maintain the league’s overall financial viability. If league owners did not cooperate, it is likely that
franchises in smaller cities would not remain financially
solvent (Fort, 2003; Harris, 1986; Helyar, 2006). Most
North American professional sport leagues have adopted
certain activities such as joint marketing campaigns,
pooled-debt instruments, and revenue sharing as methods
to prevent smaller market teams from being unable to
compete with clubs in larger markets (Fort).
Although all franchisee-franchisor companies retain
elements of cooperation and minimum standards of
performance, professional sport leagues are “peculiar”
in that performance (defined by fans as wins) is a zerosum game even though profitability for each franchise
is not (Fort, 2003). While consistently negative service
quality for one franchise in a McDonald’s chain will not
negatively affect every store nationwide, in North American professional sports, a team which perpetually loses
can negatively impact the overall financial performance
of every other franchise—specifically by decreasing
overall industry demand (Fort). In addition, where the
inadequately performing McDonald’s license can be
revoked, in professional sports, contraction of poorly
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performing franchises can be met with financial as well
as legal difficulties (“MLB at a crossroads…,” 2002).
In North American sport leagues, teams equally share
revenue from national broadcast rights, Internet advertising, licensed merchandise, and other sources (Brown,
Nagel, McEvoy, & Rascher, 2004). Franchises are permitted to keep local revenue which is typically associated with local broadcast contracts and facility revenues
such as luxury suites, parking, and concessions (Foster,
Greyser, & Walsh, 2006). The NFL shares a greater
share of its revenues than any other North American
league. In particular, where most leagues permit teams
to retain general ticketing monies, the NFL takes 40% of
all ticketing revenue and divides it equally among every
club (Brown et al., 2004). In addition, since the NFL has
no “locally” broadcast regular or postseason games, all
television revenues—which averaged $2.8 billion a year
in 2005 and which increased to over $4 billion a year
in 2006—are shared equally (Maske, 2005). The NFL
generates considerably more money from its television
contracts than any other source (Foster et al., 2006).
With such a large portion of shared revenues, many
NFL teams have focused their efforts toward developing
local revenues that they can retain for themselves rather
than share with other franchises (Brown et al., 2004). In
most cases, the most effective way to increase unshared
revenue is to improve the teams’ facility—specifically
the unshared revenues that are created through enhanced
luxury suite and premium seat sales. This has resulted
in teams searching for significantly remodeled or new
facilities, often financed by municipalities. Even under
the latest collective bargaining agreement (“National
Football League…,” 2006), where poorer revenuegenerating teams are provided a supplement from the
top 15 franchises earning the most from nontelevision
and ticketing income, facility revenues remain important.
The $100 million total amount of this new supplement in
2006 was approximately equal to the disparity between
the highest and lowest team revenues in the league that
year (Bell, 2006).
In some cases, the lure of the new stadium and its
unshared revenue sources has resulted in NFL teams
moving from larger markets to smaller ones based upon
a “sweetheart” lease arrangement (1995—Los Angeles
Rams to St. Louis; 1995—Los Angeles Raiders to Oakland; 1997—Houston Oilers to Nashville [Tennessee]
Titans; Barrett, 2003; Donatelli, 2003). However, by
choosing to maximize unshared revenues in a smaller
metropolitan area, these teams potentially may hurt a
shared-revenue source such as the national television
contract. In addition, other league-wide revenue sources
may not be as lucrative without a team’s presence in one
of the largest metropolitan communities (Martzke, 2005).
Though there may be attractive options, NFL
teams do not have to move to a new metropolitan area
to potentially increase revenues and possibly free ride.
Throughout the 1990s and into the early 21st century the
Cincinnati Bengals were consistently one of the most
profitable teams because of high revenues from the NFL’s

national television agreement as well as attendance by
diehard fans who continued to purchase tickets despite
the team’s subpar on-field performance (Daugherty,
2008). The Bengals also enhanced their profitability by
not only fielding an inferior on-field product but also by
limiting management expenses. For instance, in 2002 the
Bengals had 68 employees (not including players) while
the Buffalo Bills had 142 employees (Monk, 2002). The
Bengals small scouting staff of five (two of whom were
family members), paled in comparison with the 15 professional scouts who were employed by the Bills. Moreover,
the owner, Mike Brown, doubles as the team’s General
Manager. Clearly, the ownership presents the appearance
that it is not interested in spending money to create a
winning team (Daugherty). The Bengals’ frugality was
believed to be one of the main reasons the NFL Players
Association demanded a salary floor when the initial
NFL salary cap was implemented in 1993 (“Questions
and answers…,” 2006). In addition, the limited staff and
the team’s poor performance caused some fans to launch
a negative website titled www.mikebrownsucks.com to
voice their displeasure. In general (see Table 1), about
28% of a team’s expenses are not subject to the player
salary floor minimum. In other words, these expenses
(team expenses plus General and Administrative [G&A]
expenses) divided by player costs plus team expenses plus
G&A expenses are available for the owner to minimize.
The NFL’s extensive revenue-sharing system permits
the Bengals, or any other team, to keep only a portion of
the revenue that an additional dollar spent on marketing
generates. Ross (2000) previously noted that even though
revenue sharing creates some desirable outcomes, it may
also decrease the incentives for teams to promote inperson attendance or merchandise sales. Free riding under
an extensive revenue-sharing system may also result in
diminished player costs, as the incremental financial
effect of improving the team by signing a “star” player
is shared with the rest of the league. A revenue-sharing
system assumes that each team will maximize its fiscal
endeavors to procure the best players and field its best
possible team. However, the background and motivation
of each owner is different. For some, the team may have
been in the family for multiple generations with the team
serving as the primary source of income (Harris, 1986).
Other owners have achieved financial success in various
industries and their foray into professional sports is primarily driven by glory derived from winning rather than
the financial bottom line (Wertheim, 2007). Even within
the “new breed” of sport owners, the timing of their
purchase into the league may impact their debt service
and, therefore, their need to generate immediate financial
returns. In addition, for some owners, the desired profit
margin and/or desire to win may be augmented by public
relations considerations (e.g., getting the owner’s name
in the newspaper, on television). Given the tremendous
difference in owner motivation and financial backing, it
may be difficult to precisely determine if teams are free
riding or simply implementing predetermined spending
levels which will meet financial expectations. Regardless
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Variable

Minimum

Mean

Maximum

Std. Deviation

Population of
MSA or CMSA

191,638

5,034,051

10,571,507

5,089,43

CMSA equals 1,
MSA equals 0

0

0.5

1

0.49

Annual Wins

1

7.9

1

2.95

123,761

481,127

635,889

80,542

192

196

199

16.2

56,692

69,785

92,516

7,740

1.

3.

8.

1.

Local Revenues

$12,61

$28,61

$83.92

$12,41

Operating
Revenues

$28,14

$70,01

$189,49

$24,69

Annual
Attendance
Year Stadium
Opened
Stadium
Capacity
Number of
Major Professional Sports
Teams

Player Costs

$14,70

$41,18

$76,82

$14,19

-$13,602

$6,93

$36,50

$7,80

Team Expenses

$3,91

$8,57

$19,11

$2,82

General and
Administrative
Expenses

$2,02

$7,27

$29,46

$4,18

Operating
Profits

Note. All financial information is in $1,000s.

of the owner’s motivation, the NFL Players Association
(NFLPA) has a vested interest in determining if free riding
occurs as free riding may artificially decrease player
compensation as players receive 59.5% of total league
revenues under the current CBA (“National Football
League …,” 2006).
NFL owners have speculated that some owners are
gaining higher profits from their revenue sharing by pocketing money that was designed to be spent on improving
overall on-field quality (Helyar, 2006). A few large market
teams have even expressed frustration that revenue sharing has resulted in smaller market teams consistently
producing greater profits than the higher revenue clubs
that generated the revenue to be shared (Helyar).1 This
certainly was a consideration for the NFL owners’ deliberations regarding the most recent CBA and is likely to be
an important component of the next CBA (“Jerry Jones
fined…,” 2009). Determining whether individual teams
are truly free riding is difficult given different team’s
analysis of individual player quality and each team’s
desire to implement a specific team-building strategy
(e.g., acquire free agents, draft players, trade players).
However, identifying free riding across the league could
lead to changes in the overall revenue-sharing allocation
as the league would desire to have a plan that optimizes
revenue sharing without compromising team incentives.

There have been several studies regarding free riding
and its effects upon a variety of sport-league operations.
For instance, Késenne (2000) demonstrated the conditions that allow for revenue sharing to improve competitive balance, decrease competitive balance, or have no
effect on competitive balance. His model noted that if
the marginal impact of the visiting team on revenues is
minimal or similar across teams, then revenue sharing will
worsen competitive balance as home teams will have no
incentive to improve their quality as their increased revenues will be immediately distributed across the league.
Other authors used models to investigate revenuesharing issues specifically tied to attendance by customers who are purchasing because of the presence of the
visiting team (Fort & Quirk, 1995; Marburger, 1997;
Rascher, 1997; Vrooman, 1996). These authors found that
increases in revenue sharing will either improve competitive balance in a league or have minimal-to-no-impact on
competitive balance. Fort and Quirk noted that additional
theoretical and empirical research regarding competitive
balance needs to be conducted.
Szymanski and Késenne (2004) demonstrated that
revenue sharing makes competitive balance worse. The
authors examined gate revenues and the impact of revenue
sharing not only on competitive balance but also on the
potential total investment in player talent. Their findings
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contrasted with earlier research related to gate revenue
sharing and competitive balance in a league. Similarly,
Palomino and Rigotti (2000) showed that revenue sharing
lowered the incentive for a team to put forth the effort (in
terms of spending money to improve team quality) to win.
The authors stated, “… competing hard to win is wasteful” (p. 15). Palomino and Rigotti further noted that the
optimal level of revenue sharing is difficult to ascertain.
Although free riding incentives exist in any franchisee-franchisor relationship, the literature demonstrates
that revenue sharing in sport leagues can enhance the
effects and thus the incentive to free ride. Mason (1997)
described the principal-agent problem inherent in the
NFL’s structure, noting that interests are aligned quite
well because of revenue sharing; however, there are
still situations where owners’ interests diverge. Mason
believed the NFL could not effectively merge into a
single entity because of the need for contest legitimacy
(fan perception that decisions are made by one owner to
defeat another owner). Ultimately, sport leagues such as
the NFL desire a competitive league with enough revenue
sharing to enable every franchise to maintain competitive
balance. However, the movement of teams to smaller
markets for unshared revenues—which may decrease
overall shared revenues—combined with the potential
desire of teams with or without new facilities to present
a consistently inferior (underpaid) on-field product could
create a system where revenue sharing is not the optional
mechanism to maximize overall league financial success.

Theory
The structure of sport leagues, the NFL in particular,
is complex from the perspective of incentives and governance. Most businesses have a single principal-agent
relationship where the owner (principal) hires employees
(agents) to carry out the owner’s objectives. The NFL has
a dual-layered principal-agent structure, but it is made
even more complex by the fact that the principal at the top
(the league itself) has, as its ultimate principal, the team
owners. The Commissioner retains considerable power in
the NFL, but still serves at the discretion of the league’s
owners. In this structure, the league is a principal trying
to maximize the net value of the owners’ franchises as a
whole, subject to some minimal variation across teams.
Each owner is effectively an agent serving the league’s
objectives. At the franchise level, each owner serves as
the principal and hires employees to be the agents to carry
out his or her objectives. There is not a true principal
at the league level, but instead the group of owners act
as their own principal. To make a major change in the
league, the NFL requires three-quarters of team owners
to agree upon the change. As Mason (1997) suggested,
an individual owner may find it in their own interest to
relocate to a new city or (as this article analyzes) to offer
a low quality, inexpensive product.
Given that there are 32 owners in the NFL with
different market sizes, stadiums, lease arrangements,
fan bases, and objectives, it is not surprising that some

owners would be more interested in profit maximization
while others might want to pursue on-field victories and
Super Bowl championships. Added to this structure and
owner variability is substantial revenue sharing across
teams. The amount of revenue sharing is an endogenous
factor decided upon by the league itself. To the extent that
winning and profitability are aligned, there should not
be a principal-agent problem of diverging interests (see
Vrooman, 1996). However, winning and profit maximization are not always aligned (Gerrard, 2005).
This article examined one principal-agent issue,
whether spending less money operating a franchise (and
being a low-cost provider of the product) is more profitable. Profitability is partially based on the brand value and
revenue capabilities of the broader league as well as the
performance of the individual franchise. A single team
can spend less money, offer a low quality product, but still
draw fans and share in the national TV contract revenues,
all while lowering the overall brand of the league (as
Jerry Jones contends). This article does not discuss the
effort of agents (franchise employees) in carrying out a
team owner’s objectives. An NFL franchise can release
a football player who is not performing or fire a front
office employee who is not providing adequate results.
Thus, free riding in this context is not about effort, but
about the active decision to spend less money and earn
profits based on the brand of the league as a whole and
the quality of the other teams in the league.
Given the structure described above, let π be the
objective function of the NFL. The league’s objectives
are fluid based on the possibly changing objectives of
individual owners. However, the requirement that threequarters of owners must agree to a change tempers the
whims of individual owners, yet makes some optimization second best. Let the league maximize

∏ = ∏(∑  (), − var( ()))
i

i

(1)

where πi is the profit of the ith team. Thus, the league
tries to maximize the sum of the profits across the teams
(total league profitability), but also tries to minimize the
variation in profitability across the league. The league
chooses α (the percentage of local revenues that the
franchise gets to keep) to allow for there to be enough
revenue sharing to keep the league intact and prevent any
failing franchises. The “–var” shows that the league wants
to make the variance of profitability minimal (which is
equivalent to maximizing the negative variance). This is a
general formulation of the league’s objective function and
does not specify a model or how much weight is placed on
total profitability and the minimization of the variance in
profitability. Given that the league is comprised of owners
and can only make significant changes with an affirmative vote by three-quarters of the owners, the objective
function for the league is actually quite complicated, and
this is just one method of formulating it.
As an example, in 2001, MLB announced it was
considering the contraction of two of its franchises. The
entire league was not experiencing problems, but some
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individual franchises were believed to be experiencing
financial difficulty. The contraction option was eventually
tabled due to concerns by the MLB Players Association
and other entities but the incident displayed how MLB’s
structure that limited revenue sharing had a negative
impact upon some franchises. Therefore, the NFL has
multiple objectives including maximizing total league
profitability (or league valuation), but also upholding
financially struggling franchises.
As described earlier, there are two levels of principals making decisions in the NFL, the league level and
the franchise level (or each team owner). Equation (1)
describes the league’s decision objectives. At the franchise level, an owner maximizes his or her objectives
which are a combination of profits and winning (Gerrard,
2005; Rascher, 1997). Thus, the owner maximizes
Vi = i i + (1 − i )Wi

(2)

Vi is the value to the owner and is a function of that
owner’s profits (πi) and winning (Wi). The parameter δi
is bounded by 0 and 1 and it represents the importance of
those two attributes to owner i’s objectives. Winning and
profits are in different units, but without loss of generality,
they will both be interpreted as being in monetary units
(i.e., one could create a transformation accounting for the
amount of winning that equals a certain amount of profit).
The profit function for an NFL franchise shows that
the incremental gain from winning more games (which
is tied to spending more money in this model) is either
positive, negative, or zero and is thus an empirical issue.
Let πi be team i’s profit, such that

 i = N +  Li (Wi ) − Ci (Wi ) + (1 − ) L j (W j )

(3)

where Wi equals annual franchise wins for team i, N
equals national revenues that the franchise receives
(and is not based on its own number of wins), (LiWi) is
local franchise revenues for team i (and is based on the
number of wins for the team), α is the percentage of local
revenues that the franchise gets to keep, and Ci(Wi) is
franchise expenses (which are based on team wins under
the assumption that winning more games costs more
money). Moreover, Lj(Wj) are revenues received from the
opposing team when team i travels to team j’s stadium
to play. In summary, team i profits from the national TV
contract (largely independent of team i’s performance),
the share of its local revenues that it gets to keep, the share
of the opposing teams’ local revenues (here designated as
the single team j), and team i pays a cost to field a team.
Revenue sharing rules during the 1990s in the NFL
put α at approximately 0.60, implying that for each dollar
created at the local level, the team shared 40 cents with
the league or opposing team directly (Rascher, 1997). As
in Gerrard (2005), let
Ci = C0 + Qi + Wi

(4)

where C0 represents the fixed costs of running the
franchise and γ is the incremental or marginal cost of
purchasing talent (Qi). In other words, γ captures the

additional expenditures a franchise needs to spend to
purchase more talent (i.e., player salaries). There is also
an incremental cost to winning (λ), such as bonuses for
winning and advancing into the playoffs, etc. Equation
(5) is Wi = W (Qi ) . Thus, winning will depend on team
quality.
Similarly, let
Li = L0 + Wi

(6)

with L0 representing local revenues that are not tied
directly to winning, and β capturing the marginal revenue
from winning a game.
An interesting aspect of the NFL (and other sport
leagues) is that diverging interests between the league and
each franchise (or diverging interests across owners as it
were) can occur at the high and low ends of expenditures.
A free-riding owner would spend as little as possible in
fielding a team and maximize profits by saving on costs
and sharing in the revenues from the opposing teams. This
owner would place a low valuation on Wi in his or her
objective function. This can harm other owners because
they will receive less revenue through revenue sharing
(and the brand may begin to be harmed).
Alternatively, a high spending owner (who may be
relatively more interested in winning than other owners)
maximizes his or her objectives by fielding a winning
team. However, this can also diverge from the interests
of the league and other owners because in spending more
money, it can raise the cost of talent by increasing player
salaries. This is similar to raising rivals’ costs as discussed
in the industrial organization literature.
An owner maximizes his or her objective by choosing the quantity of talent (Qi) for the team given the fixed
parameters α, β , γ , and λ. The first order conditions are
below. It is solved by taking the derivative of Vi with
respect to Qi (labeled Vi) in Equation (2) and setting it
equal to zero to ensure that the maximum V has been
achieved. Let
Vi ' = i Wi ' −  − Wi ' + (1 − i )Wi ' = 0

(7)

Rearranging it as in (7’) below, one can see that the lefthand side is the marginal benefit of hiring an incremental
unit of talent. That is, one more unit if talent causes
winning to rise according to Equation (5), multiplied by
the amount that the owner cares about profits (δi), the
percentage of local revenues kept (α), and the impact
of winning on revenues (β). That is the effect on the
profit portion of the value function. An incremental unit
of talent also improves winning (again as in Equation
(5), and winning itself is valued by the owner according
to(1− δi). Equation (5) is assumed to be upward sloping,
but with diminishing returns (a standard assumption).

i Wi ' + (1 − i )Wi ' =  + Wi '

(7’)

The right-hand side of Equation (7’) shows the marginal
cost of purchasing one more unit of talent. The direct cost
(γ) is added to the cost that is based on winning (e.g., performance bonuses or payments for making the playoffs).
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Before conducting the static analysis, it is useful
to consider some special cases for comparison. First, if
owner i was a profit maximizer who did not care about
winning, then δi would be 1 and Equation (7’) would
reduce to Wi ' =  + Wi ' (7”). Further, if the convention in Fort and Quirk (1995) is followed, where talent
is defined such that one incremental unit of talent equals
one additional win (violating the nonlinearity assumption above), then we have  =  +  (Equation (7’’’).
Finally, if we assume that there are no bonus payments
for winning, then  =  (Equation (7’’’’). The empirical section will test this final equation along with direct
tests of expenditures on profitability. The more general
equations cannot be examined with the empirical data
because there is no way to distinguish between the talent
level of each team and its number of wins with the data
set being used.
For a sport-focused owner (one who strongly desires
to win), the marginal cost of purchasing more talent rises
as more talent is purchased. Thus, total player payroll
and payroll per unit of talent is higher for sport-focused
owners. The implication is that there is a tradeoff between
maximizing profits and winning, so a free-riding owner
(whose primary concern is not winning, but making
profits) will hire less talent than a sport-focused owner
or one who cares about both winning and profits. This
is important because the optimal actions taken will vary
across owner type. If it were such that winning as much
as possible coincided with profit maximizing, then there
would not be a free riding problem because all owners
would try to win (and thus maximize profits) as much as
possible. This proposition can be seen by noting that as
δi decreases (meaning the owner cares more about winning), the LHS of Equation (7’) rises (because αβ≤1),
causing the RHS to rise (which is an increase in marginal
cost caused by increasing the level of talent). Therefore,
being a sport-focused owner is consistent with making
less than maximum profits.
A second proposition is that sportsman owners, in
their quest to win more games, cause the incremental cost
of hiring playing talent to rise for all team owners (not just
themselves). This follows from the same analysis above
for the sport-focused owner, only that the marginal cost
of hiring talent is faced by all team owners.
The league chooses the level of revenue sharing
according to its optimization problem (Equation (1)).
Higher levels of revenue sharing (lower α) correspond to
a decrease in the marginal benefit from winning (LHS of
Equation (7’)), so owners purchase less talent, lowering
Wi (which keeps the LHS equal to the RHS). Further, for
profit-maximizing owners, this is even more pronounced.
Comparing Equations (7’) and (7”), a fixed decrease in
α lowers the LHS of Equation (7”) more than Equation
(7’). Profit-maximizers react more strongly to increased
revenue sharing by lowering their talent purchases than do
sport-focused owners. In fact, in the extreme if all owners
were win maximizers, then α drops out of Equation (7’)
and revenue sharing has no impact on the decisions of

the owners. They all try to buy more talent, bidding up
its price.
Sport-focused owners’ decisions increase the costs
for profit maximizing owners, but is the opposite true?
Do profit maximizers who free ride harm sport-focused
owners’ profits? This is a cross effect of the change in
profits for team i from a decrease in talent purchased by
team j. Using Equations (3), (5), and (6), the derivative
of πi with respect to Qj is (1 − )W j' , which is positive.
Therefore, a decrease in playing talent by team j (the
free rider), lowers the profits of team i. In addition, it
is exacerbated by increased revenue sharing (lower α).
In summary, the key theoretical findings are (a) that
there is a trade-off between sport-focused owners wanting to win and maximize profits, (b) free riding by one
owner will harm the profits of sport-focused owners, (c)
higher revenue sharing will cause owners to want to free
ride even more than they normally would, (d) if teams
are profit-maximizing, then the sensitivity of winning on
revenues (β) will be equal to the sensitivity of winning on
costs (γ and λ), and (e) if the NFL is structured to create
incentives to free ride or keep costs down, then lowered
expenses (from player talent acquisition) will raise
profits because the revenue effect will be outweighed by
the expense effect (from winning). Substantial revenue
sharing and the existence of different owner types across
the spectrum of profits and winning causes some owners
(those who care more about profits than winning) to free
ride on the league’s brand and talent in the NFL. Two
testable hypotheses are summarized in (d) and (e) above.

Methods
Subjects
Annual NFL team financial data were gathered for the
years 1989–1999 to determine whether free riding exists
in the NFL. Data were collected from the conforming
financial statements sent by each team to the Commissioner’s office and released during The Oakland Raiders
v. National Football League (2001) case. Team-specific
financial data included local revenues, operating revenues, player payroll, team expenses, G&A expenses,
and operating profit. Of the 319 available observations,
309 (97%) were useable. More recent data from the
NFL are not publicly available. There were some critics
of the accuracy of the financial data (Zimbalist, 2001);
however, this information was sent from each franchise
to the Commissioner and the NFL Board of Governors
(made up of some of the team owners) and was used to
set NFL policy. As well, its accuracy was not disputed
during the trial.

Variables
Two categories of profits and four categories of expenses
were developed. The categories were:
Operating profits—profit reported in the league
documents
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Calculated profits—operating revenue minus summary expenses
Player costs—player payroll reported in the league
documents
General and administrative expenses—G&A
expenses reported in the league documents
Team expenses—direct team-related expenses such
as salaries and other costs associated with coaching,
scouting, and training
Summary expenses—the sum of player payroll,
G&A expenses, and team expenses.
To compare data reported over the time frame, a second
set of financial variables was created by transforming the
financial data into 1998 dollars. Comparisons could then
be made across years and across teams, not just across
teams for a given year.
The annual number of wins, home game total
attendance (including preseason games), the age of the
stadium, stadium capacity for football, the number of
major professional sport teams (MLB, NBA, National
Hockey League (NHL), and NFL) in the local area, and
the local MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) or CMSA
(Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area) population
were used as control factors in the analysis. These data

were collected from sportsline.com, ballparks.com, the
U.S. Census Bureau, and individual team websites. The
population entry was created by interpolating data from
the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. Table 1 outlines the
summary statistics for these data, and Table 2 provides
correlations.

Procedures
The data were graphically analyzed across the various
combinations of profits, revenues, and expenses. Given
that there are two forms of profit (operating and calculated) and four types of expenses (player, general and
administrative, team, and summary), eight plots representing all combinations of the data were created. To
account for control factors that may skew the graphical
results, locally-weighted least squares (LOWESS) regressions were completed. LOWESS regressions essentially
run a separate linear regression for each data point using
some of the other data points right around it. It then plots
a line from that regression, slides over, and does it again
with the next data point, until all of the data points have
been analyzed. Given that it is a nonparametric method,
there are no coefficient estimates produced, but instead a
graphical representation of the regression curve is created.
The size of the group used for each data point and how

Table 2 Correlation Matrix
Number

Variable

1

1

Population of
MSA or CMSA

1.00

2

CMSA equals 1,
MSA equals 0

0.54

3

Annual Wins

-0.05 -0.03

1.00

4

Annual Attendance

0.13

0.13

0.42

1.00

5

Year Stadium
Opened

-0.15 -0.29

0.01

0.08

1.00

6

Stadium Capacity

0.30

0.00

0.09

0.45

-0.16

1.00

7

Number of
Major Professional Sports
Teams

0.91

0.57

-0.06

0.17

-0.15

0.30

1.00

8

Local Revenues

-0.01

0.03

0.20

0.36

0.30

0.04

0.00

1.00

9

Operating Revenues

-0.02 -0.01

0.12

0.25

0.26

0.01

0.00

0.87

1.00

Player Costs

-0.01 -0.04

0.09

0.17

0.19

0.04

0.00

0.70

0.91

1.00

Operating Profits -0.10 -0.07

0.12

0.22

0.27

-0.08 -0.06

0.65

0.58

0.28

1.00

10
11

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1.00

12

Team Expenses

0.18

0.12

0.02

0.25

0.08

0.24

0.12

0.48

0.60

0.62

0.00

1.00

13

General and
Administrative
Expenses

-0.08

0.09

0.11

0.11

0.12

-0.12 -0.03

0.71

0.68

0.52

0.33

0.43

1.00
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much weight is placed on the closer versus further points
within that group is chosen by the user. This analysis used
bandwidths between 0.4 and 0.8, meaning that 40–80%
of the data are used, centered on the specific data point
that is being estimated. In addition, the weighting mechanism chosen is the standard one developed by Cleveland
(1979), who first introduced LOWESS. It is called the
tricube weight function and gives no weight to points
that are a given distance from the data point in question.
The result of LOWESS is a nonlinear regression line
that shows small variations in the data. Because LOWESS
uses standard regression techniques over small subsets
of the data, it is good at handling outliers by minimizing
their effects on the final LOWESS regression line.
It is possible that there is a variable that is correlated
with both profit and expenses, such as market size, that
is missing from the graphical analysis (i.e., a specification problem). To investigate this, a series of regressions,
both linear and polynomial, were completed as well.
Generally, only reduced form models with statistically
significant variables were reported (not the full models
with insignificant variables).
Separately, the parameters β and γ were analyzed
from Equations (4) and (6) by regressing summary
expenses on team wins to get γ, and regressing local
revenues on team wins to get β. The reasons for conducting numerous analyses around the same question is that
nonlinear regressions (LOWESS) allow one to see any
specific curves or kinks in the data that linear regression
smoothes over. However, the nonlinear regressions are
not interpretable in terms of incremental impacts (i.e.,
they do not produce coefficients). Besides understanding what the parameters are, this is the first analysis that
directly compares profitability in professional sports to
expenditures.

Hypotheses
It is important to note that compared with the NBA
and NHL, the NFL has exhibited lower fitting models
of financial variables. Miller (2009) created empirical
models of franchise value for the NBA, NHL, and NFL.
His goodness-of-fit for the NBA and NHL models were
around 0.68 and 0.50 respectively. However, for the NFL
models, it was less than 0.28. One of his reasons given
is that there is extensive revenue sharing (driven by the
national TV contract) that flattens out revenues across
teams regardless of the underlying fundamental differences across winning and population. Similarly, Alexander and Kern (2004) found a positive and significant
relationship between franchise values and population for
the NBA and NHL, but not for the NFL. Low goodnessof-fit for the profit regressions of NFL franchises is not
surprising given the previous finding related to the NFL
and related to estimating profit functions as opposed to
revenue functions.
This notion is related to one of the points of this
article, that the NFL purposefully shares revenues regardless of the nature of each team’s market or winning

prospects to minimize the risk for franchise owners. The
league realizes that each owner is in business together
(not competitors) in many ways and it is in the interests
of the league as a whole to minimize the financial risk.
Statistically, this causes the dependent variable to have
low variance, thus there is not much variation for the
explanatory variables to explain.
As discussed in the theoretical section, it is expected
that β ≥ γ because the financial gain from winning ought
to be at least as high as the financial cost (under the
assumption that λ = 0, or that the playoff payments to
players is de minimis). In addition, it is expected that αβ
− γ will be near zero relative to the size of α and β (based
on profit maximization) or negative to keep league costs
down. This will also be investigated directly by considering the relationship between expenses and profits (is that
relationship negative, as expected to minimize leaguewide costs or is that relationship positive?).

Analysis and Results
Free riding in a sport league occurs when a team is able
to generate increased profits by offering a lower quality
on-field product. An NFL owner is potentially able to free
ride because of the NFL’s brand value and its substantial
revenue-sharing policy. Figures 1a—1h contain scatter
plots of the two profit measures versus the four expense
categories using the inflation-adjusted variables. They
also contain a linear fitted line from a linear regression
along with 95% confidence intervals.
As can be seen in the figures, franchises with lower
player payrolls, lower team expenses, or lower summary
expenses typically have higher profits. There does not
appear to be a relationship between G&A expenses and
profits. This is not surprising given that the variance
among teams for G&A expenses is minimal.
Figures 2a—2h contain LOWESS graphs of the
inflation-adjusted profit versus expenses. Since LOWESS
is a nonparametric analysis, instead of an equation, graphs
of the fitted relationship are created. The relationships
are relatively linear indicating that a linear regression
is a reasonable approximation of the true relationship
between the variables. However, the graph of adjusted
operating profits versus adjusted summary expenses is
U-shaped. The U-shape indicates that profit can be made
by either free riding via lower expenses or by spending
enough money to improve winning and attendance so that
revenues are increased at a greater rate than costs. This
is accounted for in the corresponding linear regressions
in Tables 3 and 4.
As a variable could be correlated with profits and
expenses, a series of regressions, both linear and polynomial, were completed. The two inflation-adjusted calculated profits models in Table 3 demonstrate that player
payroll and summary expenses are negatively related to
profit at the .01 level of statistical significance. The results
are economically as well as statistically significant. A
$1 million increase in player payroll is associated with

Figure 1a—1h — Graphs of inflation-adjusted profits and expenses.
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Figure 2a—2h — LOWESS graphs of inflation-adjusted profits and expenses.
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Table 3 Adjusted Calculated Profits and Adjusted Operating Profits (in 1998 Dollars)
Adjusted Calculated
Profits with Player
Costs

Adjusted Calculated
Profits with
Summary Expenses

Adjusted Operating
Profits with Player
Costs

Adjusted Operating
Profits with
Summary Expenses

F-statistic

14.84****

12.42****

28.16****

11.88****

R-squared

0.21

0.17

0.25

0.25

Number of Observations

309

309

309

309

Model

Ramsey RESET test

F = 0.77

F = 0.82

F = 1.75

F = 1.42

Cook-Weisberg test

X2 = 0.10

X2 = 0.81

X2 = 1.30

X2 = 1.35

Variance Inflation Factor test

Mean VIF = 1.08

Mean VIF = 1.11

Mean VIF = 1.08

Mean VIF = 1.11

Dependent Variable

Adj. Calc. Profits

Adj. Calc. Profits

Adj. Op Profits

Adj. Op. Profits

-236,978***

-270,217***

-62,597

-127,916

Independent Variables:
Constant
Player Costs Adjusted for
Inflation

-0.82****

Summary Expenses Adjusted
for Inflation

-1.84****
-0.46****

-1.13****

Summary Expenses Adjusted
for Inflation Squared
CMSA or MSA
Year Stadium Opened

.0000199***
2,690*

3,612***

763

3,225

154.6***

166.2***

94

119*

Significance: *—10% level; **—5% level; ***—1% level; ****—0.1% level.

an $820,000 decrease in calculated profit. This is not
surprising since nearly 70% of all revenues are shared in
the NFL, but no player costs are shared. Thus, purchasing
a talented player for $1 million might generate over $1
million in revenue. However, most of that will be shared
with the league, making net franchise profits decrease.
An increase in summary expenses by $1 million
is associated with a $460,000 decrease in adjusted calculated profits (see Table 3). In the regressions, annual
number of wins and annual attendance were not included
since they are intermediate outcomes stemming from
player costs or summary expenses. Player costs and
summary expenses were both positively correlated with
wins and attendance. Population and the number of major
professional sport teams were not statistically significant.
Instrumental variables regression and linear regression
with interaction terms were investigated with the results
being similar to those reported here. The Ramsey RESET
test for omitted variable bias was negative. The CookWeisberg test for heteroscedasticity was also negative.
Variance-inflation factors were low, showing no multicollinearity issues in Table 3 except for the polynomial
(last column).
However, the CMSA dummy variable was significant
and positive in the full regressions. Finally, as a stadium
gets older, adjusted calculated profits decrease by about
$160,000 per year. As expected and mentioned above, the
R-square only explains about 20% of the variation in profits. The goodness-of-fit for the adjusted operating profits
regressions (columns 3 and 4) is higher with R-square of

0.25. An interesting finding is that the regression examining operating expenses (last column) is U-shaped (as
suggested by the corresponding LOWESS regression). It
has a minimum at about $115,000 (which is on the higher
end of adjusted summary expenses across the teams).
Table 4 depicts the analysis of the variables which
were not adjusted for inflation. Multicollinearity was
significant in Table 4. This is not surprising given the
many variables increasing over time (simply because of
inflation) that would be correlated together in Table 4.
Table 3 accounted for that by using inflation-adjusted
variables. The findings in Table 4 were somewhat similar
to those in Table 3, but it appears that multicollinearity
issues caused the coefficients to be different than those
in Table 3 (because multicollinearity causes t-statistics
to be artificially high, making it appear that a variable
is significant, when it might not be). As a result, the
coefficients, while technically unbiased, have a very
broad confidence interval. Yearly indicator variables
were used to account for the annual growth in overall
franchise expenses in the NFL, with each being statistically significant (p. < .001), with 1989 as the comparison
year. The variables of interest, player costs and summary
expenses, both had negative impacts on operating profits
and calculated profits and were statistically significant (p.
<.01). The full models were all statistically significant
and had R-squares ranging from 0.36 to 0.44. The results
in Table 3 statistically have a stronger fit, but Table 4 is
included to show how the raw data (i.e., not adjusted for
inflation) performed.
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Table 4 Operating Profits and Calculated Profits (in Current Dollars)
Operating Profits with
Summary Expenses

F-statistic

12.36****

11.60****

9.62****

9.72****

R-squared

0.39

0.36

0.44

0.38

Number of Observations

309

309

309

Ramsey RESET test

F = 1.58

F = 1.87

F = 2.01

Cook-Weisberg test

X2

X2

X2

Model

= 1.42

= 1.54

Calculated Profits
with Player Costs

Calculated Profits
with Summary
Expenses

Operating Profits with
Player Costs

= 1.79

1.97
X2

= 1.01

Variance Inflation
Factor test

Mean VIF = 2.87

Mean VIF = 6.52

Mean VIF = 2.87

Mean VIF = 6.52

Dependent Variable

Operating Profits

Operating Profits

Calculated Profits

Calculated Profits

Constant

-168,299***

-146,546***

-245,885***

-275,407***

Player Costs

-0.655****

Independent Variables:
-.935***

Summary Expenses

-1.09***

Summary Expenses
Squared

5.88e-06***

CMSA or MSA
Year Stadium Opened

1,629*

1,346***

-0.450***

2,434*

3,111**

93***

86***

136***

149***

7,150****

8,495****

8,307****

7,210****

Year Indicator 1991

9,267****

10,835****

12,872****

9,944****

Year Indicator 1992

10,456****

12,334****

17,350****

12,630****

Year Indicator 1993

17,708****

17,381****

24,752***

14,186***

Year Indicator 1994

18,166****

20,132****

23,790****

16,866****

Year Indicator 1995

20,312****

22,389****

25,573****

18,171****

Year Indicator 1996

21,382****

22,340****

30,218****

20,750****

Year Indicator 1997

23,257****

24,749****

32,351****

23,577****

Year Indicator 1998

38,501****

35,332****

52,456****

39,469****

Year Indicator 1999

39,599****

31,872****

61,352****

44,132****

Year Indicator 1990

Significance: *—10% level; **—5% level; ***—1% level; ****—0.1% level.

There was a clear negative relationship between
profit and summary expenses (Table 4). Stadium characteristics and a measure of market size appeared to affect
profitability, but the impact of expenses on profits was
greater. An analysis of interaction terms and an analysis of polynomials of the different expense categories
revealed no significant findings, except for a quadratic
on Summary Expenses for the Operating Profits model in
Table 4. Solving for the minimum point on the quadratic
leads to a minimum Operating Profits where Summary
Expenses equals about $93 million. This is consistent
with the Figure 2c.
An examination of linear regressions and LOWESS
by year showed similar results. In 100% of the 44
annual linear regressions containing operating profits
or calculated profits versus player payroll or summary
expenses and control factors, the coefficient on the

expense category was negative, with 57% being statistically significant. In all 11 of the LOWESS regressions of
annual operating profit versus player payroll, the slope
of the nonparametric relationship was negative. In six of
the analyses of annual operating profit versus summary
expenses, the relationship was negative, while in the
remaining five analyses, it was U-shaped. Similar results
were obtained using calculated profits.
An analysis of the parameters β and γ is shown in
Table 5. The simple univariate regressions (with constant
terms) yielded significant results for both the model and
the independent variables. However, the models for revenues and expenses have low R-squared goodness-of-fit
parameters. This is partially because these are single
variable models without other explanatory variables. The
dependent variables were expressed in thousands of dollars; therefore, interpretation of the coefficients needs to
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Table 5 Assessment of the Sensitivity of
Revenues and Expenses to Winning
Adjusted Local
Revenues

Adjusted
Summary
Expenses

F-statistic

33.95* * * *

17.74* * * *

R-squared

0.10

0.06

Number of Observations

309

309

Adj. Local Revenues

Adj. Summary
Expenses

Constant

32,420* * * *

76,496* * * *

Team Wins

1,142.6* * * *

752.7* * * *

Model

Dependent Variable
Independent Variables:

Parameters:
α

0.61

β

1,142,6222

γ

752,6853

α*β

685,573

α*β −γ

-67,112

Significance: *-10% level; * *-5% level; * * *-1% level; * * * *-0.1%
level.
1Based on the revenue sharing rules in the NFL during the 1990 .
s
2The coefficient on team wins is multiplied by 1,000 to account for
Adjusted Local Revenues represented in thousands of dollars, not
actual dollars.
3The coefficient on team wins is multiplied by 1,000 to account for
Adjusted Summary Expenses represented in thousand of dollars, not
actual

be adjusted. For instance, during the 1990s, an additional
win yielded $1.14 million dollars of local revenue but
also cost a franchise $752,685. Given that 60% of local
revenues are kept by the franchise (with 40% being shared
with other teams), the net revenues from an additional win
(α* β) were $685,573. An analysis of equation (4) showed
that the incremental change in profits from winning one
more game (and having to share some of those revenues
and incur the full cost of creating them) was -$67,112.
This was consistent with the findings in Figures 1 and 2
and Tables 3 and 4.

Discussion
Across NFL teams, there is a wide range of player payroll
costs and summary expenses. Based upon the current data
analysis, it appears that some NFL owners choose to free
ride while others do not, with some spending more on
players than maximizing profits would warrant. Overall,

the purpose of the multiple methods used to investigate
various definitions of expenses and various definitions
of profit show that spending less produces higher profits
(other than the U-shaped regression between adjusted
operating profits and adjusted summary expenses).
Empirically, the NFL is structured to slightly create the
incentive to keep costs down by spending less. Theoretically, this is consistent with the notion that some teams
will maximize profits (and spend less) while others will
maximize wins (or some combination of the two) causing
the relationship across the league to be downward sloping
between profits and expenses.
The high spending owners are presumably sportfocused owners. Another possible explanation for this
behavior is the characteristic of a team’s market. Owners
in larger markets, more so than owners in smaller markets,
may spend more to create higher quality teams because
it is in their economic interest (Gerrard, 2005; Késenne,
2000; Rascher, 1997). Yet, the LOWESS graphs and
regressions results show that this is not actually profitable,
but instead only produces more wins. Only in one case is
the profit versus expenses function U-shaped indicating
that spending a lot or a little is most profitable, but being
in the middle between the extremes is not. This coincides
with the general finding in sport economics research that
population is an important factor in determining demand.
Therefore, an additional unit of quality for the product
being sold will increase the actual demand for tickets
(and related merchandise, concessions, etc.) by a larger
number in a market with a higher population. Thus, there
are more potential fans to be acquired by increasing team
quality in a larger market.
While market characteristics do impact NFL profitability, these characteristics do not completely explain the
findings that some teams spend less on team quality but
reap higher profits. The correlation between population
and team expenses is positive and significant, but small
(e.g., the correlation between population and summary
expenses, team expenses, and player costs is 0.13, 0.30,
and 0.14, respectively). In addition, higher costs in larger
population centers might simply result from the higher
cost of doing business in more urban areas.
A second possible explanation relates to each owner’s
motivation. Certainly, each owner desires to experience
on-field success and most owners would like to spend
more on team quality to own a competitive sport team.
In fact, many owners are able to spend more because they
have significant wealth beyond their ownership of an NFL
team. For example, Jim Irsay, owner of the Indianapolis
Colts, sold personal stock and real estate holdings to pay
$100 million in signing bonuses from 1999 through 2008
(Burke, 2008). However, some owners may not have the
desire or the ability to use outside funding sources. A
number of owners have a large portion of their wealth
invested in their NFL franchise and are more likely to
treat their team as a profit-maximizing business. These
owners might find it more profitable to free ride than to
spend for a high performance team.
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An examination of NFL ownership during the 1990s
demonstrates that free riding occurred in specific cases.
Two of the teams that appeared to have been free riding
the most were the Cincinnati Bengals and the Chicago
Bears (see Table 6). In 1991, Mike Brown became the
majority owner of the Bengals, a team that his father,
Paul Brown, founded. The Chicago Bears were owned by
Virginia McCaskey, team founder George Halas’s daughter. It is believed that their stake in the NFL constitutes
the majority of their wealth (Ludwig, 2008; Mulligan,
2007). The Pittsburgh Steelers, to a lesser extent, were
also free riders during this time period. The Steelers were
owned by Dan Rooney, the son of founder Art Rooney.
From an efficiency perspective, the Steelers were able to
succeed on the field (winning 10 games or more in five
of the 11 seasons) with low expenditures compared with
other NFL teams.
The Tampa Bay Buccaneers were, perhaps, the most
egregious of all free riders. The Buccaneers were owned
by Hugh Culverhouse until 1995, when Malcolm Glazer
purchased the franchise. Clearly, Malcolm Glazer does
not fit the mold of an owner whose primary financial
investment is an NFL club as he is the 462nd wealthiest
individual in the world (Kroll, 2008). Though it appears
that some owners of “family-operated” teams appear to
free ride for economic “necessity,” some wealthier owners
may free ride for profit maximization.
Ultimately, the decision to potentially free ride is
idiosyncratic and depends on the motivation of each
owner. From the perspective of the league, however,
having incentives to reduce payroll and on-field quality
Table 6 Team Ranking of Profit Divided
by Summary Expenses (Sorted Highest to
Lowest)
Franchise and Ranking of Highest Profit divided by
Summary Expenses
Chicago Cincinnati Pittsburgh Tampa Bay
Year
Bears
Bengals
Steelers
Buccaneers
1989
2
5
6
1
1990
4
6
5
3
1991
2
5
1
3
1992
4
5
3
1
1993
1
2
3
7
1994
2
4
13
7
1995
4
8
11
2
1996
8
6
11
1
1997
15
8
10
1
1998
18
13
10
1
1999
18
14
9
5
Note. The NFL averaged 29 teams over the time period.
1 A conversation by one of the authors with an NFL team official
revealed that the NFL is concerned that certain teams rely extensively
upon the rest of the league to generate revenues, especially since some
of those teams are extremely profitable.

to the detriment of the rest of the league is problematic.
It is in the interest of the league to establish policies that
help keep costs under control while still maintaining quality and competitive balance. In particular, the salary cap
and revenue-sharing policies help lower player salaries
and other costs (e.g., team marketing costs). A problem
exists when some teams are primarily carrying the burden
of maintaining and growing the league’s brand (e.g.,
the Dallas Cowboys), while others are harming, or free
riding on, the brand (e.g., the Cincinnati Bengals). From
a league’s perspective, creating incentives to save costs
is good, but allowing teams to reduce on-field quality to
do so can be detrimental.
Until 2010, the NFL had a policy that forced teams
to spend a minimum amount on player payroll (along
with its player cap) yet free riding existed. With the
owners opting to end the current CBA (Clayton, 2008),
the salary floor and cap have been removed for at least
the 2010 season. With the elimination of the salary
floor, additional teams may now be inclined to free ride.
Ultimately, this may harm the league’s brand reducing
the value of the league as a whole and the value of its
member franchises as well.
Teams also are not required to spend in other areas
that impact quality such as scouting, coaching, training
facilities, and staff. As it is likely not feasible to regulate
all team expenditures, another solution, one that the
league has recently implemented, is to exempt a majority
of some revenue streams from the revenue-sharing pool.
The NFL’s policy covering stadium-related revenues
allows owners to keep almost all of the nonticket revenue
generated by the stadium itself. Major League Baseball
has enacted a similar policy. By allowing owners to retain
a majority of stadium revenues, an incentive is provided
for the owners to build new stadiums. Simultaneously,
their motivation to field a competitive team increases so
that the owner can then leverage the value of the new
stadium (e.g., increase luxury suite and club seat sales).
Other professional leagues face these same problems.
However, these leagues share a lower percentage of their
revenues so the problem is not as severe.
Ultimately the NFL has been extremely successful
since its decision to equally share its national television
revenues in 1960. John Mara, New York Giants co-owner,
stated, “you could argue that we deserve a bigger piece
of the pie, but it’s the reason that the NFL is the strongest
professional league on the planet.” (Burke, 2003, para.
4). The willingness to generously share revenues among
NFL owners has contributed to the continual and rapid
growth of league and team revenues and the league’s
brand strength. However, the presence of free riding could
undermine the league’s financial performance. The new
revenue-sharing model that will be negotiated beginning
in 2010 or 2011 may become even more important to the
league as average team operating income was reduced
24% since its peak during the 2002 season as a result of
changes to the model under the 2006–2010 CBA (Badenhausen, Ozanian, & Settimi, 2008).
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Directions for Future Research
While previous papers have investigated free riding and
revenue sharing in professional sport, these papers have
primarily focused on the impact of revenue sharing
on competitive balance (Késenne, 2000; Palomino &
Rigotti, 2000; Szymanski & Késenne, 2004) and attendance (Fort & Quirk, 1995; Marburger, 1997; Rascher,
1997; Vrooman, 1996). This paper has advanced existing
knowledge regarding free riding in professional sport by
directly examining the impact of free riding upon NFL
franchise profitability. Moreover, it is the first article with
such an extensive data set allowing a detailed understanding of which owners free ride. Perhaps surprisingly,
the free-riding teams are not the ones in small markets.
Further, the need for expanding research related to free
riding was called for by Lopatka and Herndon (1997)
and Fort and Quirk (1995). However, there remain areas
of investigation that should take place.
The causes of the observed free riding in the NFL
should be closely examined especially, as the league
prepares to negotiate a new CBA and develops a new
revenue-sharing system. Perhaps there are systematic or
structural reasons beyond each owner’s personal ownership objectives that result in free riding. An analysis of
the degree of revenue sharing each year and whether it is
a significant predictor of free riding is warranted as well.
Similar analyses of other leagues would help determine
whether free riding is a widespread problem. Anecdotally,
it appears that Donald Sterling, owner of the Los Angeles Clippers, free rides in the NBA (“#25 Los Angeles
Clippers,” 2008). Various MLB teams also appear to free
ride occasionally. After its success during the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the Oakland Athletics cut payroll and
team quality significantly and business decisions became
more driven by the pursuit of profits. Even though the
team’s performance was poor, the ownership group was
satisfied (Lewis, 2003).
Also, the recent increase in revenue sharing in MLB
has uncovered a number of teams, such as the Milwaukee
Brewers and Tampa Bay Rays, which were receiving
revenue-sharing money while not improving the quality
of their major league on-field product (Zimbalist, 2004).
For example, the Milwaukee Brewers revenue-sharing
portion grew from $2 million to $18 million between
2002 and 2004. During the same timeframe, the Brewers’
payroll decreased from $50 million to $28 million, which
was the lowest in MLB (Badenhausen, 2004). The Pittsburgh Pirates reportedly received nearly $18 million in
revenue-sharing money in 2005, yet the team cut its payroll approximately $25 million between 2001 and 2005.
Kevin McClatchy, former majority owner of the Pirates,
stated that he used his portion of revenue-sharing money
to pay off existing debts and not to improve the team’s
quality (Kovacevic, 2005). As a result of these ownership
actions and given the drastic changes in revenue sharing
that have taken place, a longitudinal analysis regarding
revenue sharing in MLB needs to be undertaken.
The National Hockey League has historically shared
little of its revenue. In 2003, it was reported that the

league shared 9% of its revenue (“How the NFL levels…,”
2003). The NHL’s poor economic model led to sufficient
revenue disparities between teams to cause a player
lockout that eventually canceled the 2004–2005 season.
Under the new CBA with its players, a hard salary cap and
floor was implemented as was increased revenue sharing
(“Collective bargaining agreement…,” 2005). The NHL’s
revenue-sharing plan requires teams to maintain a set
attendance level to qualify for certain revenue-sharing
payments. This, combined with a salary floor, ensures
some effort to invest in team quality. Ultimately, every
sport league needs to determine the optimal revenuesharing model to ensure league financial viability while
also preventing free riding.
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